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Foreword for Regulation in the Fringe
Economy Symposium
John P. Caskey*
The timing of this symposium could not be better. The economy of
the United States is still suffering the consequences of a financial crisis
that had its origins in lax mortgage lending standards with cascading
effects that threw millions out of work and wiped out the modest
wealth of many low- and middle-income households. As one of its
responses to the crisis, Congress created the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB), which is charged with, among other things,
devising regulations for banks and non-bank financial institutions that
better protect individuals from unfair and abusive financial contracts.1
The CFPB will have to make tough decisions.2 Although payday
lenders, car title lenders, and other small-value, high-cost consumer
finance firms, collectively commonly called “fringe” lenders, did not
cause the financial crisis, the crisis made people acutely aware that not
all debt contracts are individually or socially beneficial. Consequently,
all types of subprime lending, which disproportionately go to low- and
moderate-income individuals, are currently subject to heightened
scrutiny. In the case of fringe lenders, there are two basic questions.
First, does access to high-cost, small-value loans benefit borrowers?
Second, do the regulations that govern fringe lenders need to be
changed to improve transparency, to forbid certain contractual terms,
or to make consumers more cognizant of potential pitfalls associated
with the contracts?
The Articles in this symposium tackle these issues. Several of the
Articles address payday lending. Others examine related issues in title
lending; bank overdraft protection (ODP) programs; small-value, shortterm lending outside the United States; and social and philosophical
issues related to restrictions on free credit markets generally. A third
set of Articles analyzes topics that are often not associated with small* Professor of Economics, Swarthmore College.
1. 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (2011) (stating the purpose, objectives, and function of
the CFPB).
2. Joseph Lynyak, Commentary: Advice for the CFPB Head, AM. BANKER,
July 27, 2010, at 8 (describing the CFPB’s charged tasks as “Herculean”).
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value subprime lending, but clearly should be, or arguably could be.
Articles in this category cover peer-to-peer lending, government loans
to students attending for-profit trade schools and colleges, and
nonfinancial harms to families with excessive debt burdens.
It is common for academics writing about fringe credit markets to
avoid taking definitive stands on what government regulatory agencies
should do, ducking the tough issues with the safe statement, “More
research is needed.” The authors of the Articles in this symposium do
not do that. Almost all take the bull by the horns and advocate specific
regulations or regulatory approaches. Of course, the authors, who come
from a variety of philosophical perspectives, advocate different policies.
Some believe that if an individual freely agrees to borrow in a
transparent credit contract it must be because this is the individual’s
best option, and eliminating or restricting access to this alternative can
only reduce the well-being of that person. Others argue that cognitive
or behavioral flaws can lead people to make short-term decisions that
are not in their long-term interest and the elimination or restriction of
some options can raise people’s welfare. In the case of loans to attend
for-profit schools, the loan contract itself may be transparent and fair,
but the career benefits of the education it finances may not be.
Regardless of where the authors stand in this debate, they are
uniformly well-informed about the regulatory environment and the
business operations in the credit markets they analyze. Readers of the
Articles in this symposium will learn important institutional details
related to fringe lending in nearly all its forms.
In addition to providing a well-informed overview of the
functioning of these credit markets, the Articles tackle a number of key
themes that are critical to thinking about regulating high-cost
consumer lending. In a short introduction, I cannot do justice to all of
the important issues, but let me draw your attention to three basic
questions that strike me as most important and pervasive in the
symposium.
The first key question is: Does access to payday lenders, or close
alternatives, benefit or harm their customers? The majority of Articles
in the symposium address this issue, some directly and others
obliquely. Several of the Articles emphasize a closely related point: the
customer base of fringe lenders is heterogeneous, so access to high-cost,
short-term loans might benefit some while hurting others. Some
customers, for example, might rationally use a payday loan after
considering the benefits and costs of the loan and close alternatives.
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Other customers might focus only on the short-term benefits without
rationally weighing the costs. In the face of such heterogeneity,
determining the net social benefit is a complex empirical challenge.
One of the Articles takes a different angle to the population diversity
issue. It asks: If it makes sense to ban high-cost, short-term loans to
one major segment of the population, such as military personnel, why
does it not make sense to extend this ban to the rest of the population?
The second key question concerns how we should regulate
businesses in the fringe economy. At an abstract level, this question is
about whether there is an ideal set of limitations on the contractual
terms or disclosures of payday lenders, peer-to-peer loan firms, bank
ODP programs, title lenders, for-profit schools providing debt-financed
educations, etc. Nearly all of the authors in this symposium take on
this issue and, in doing so, also tackle a number of related practical
questions, including:
•
•

•
•

Should regulations be at the federal, state, or local level, or
all three?
Should high-cost consumer lenders be exempt from state
laws if they are operated by Native American tribes? What
if a tribe simply functions as a passive minority partner in
a firm run by people who are not tribal members?
Should there be an umbrella regulatory agency or should
various regulatory agencies take responsibility for
different aspects of the businesses?
Should regulations focus on restricting contractual terms
or should they try to address potential cognitive failures or
information deficits among customers? If customers
overestimate, for example, their probability of promptly
repaying a loan, perhaps the lender should be required to
inform potential clients of the typical number of loan
renewals among its customers.

The third key question is: What happens if high-cost consumer
lending is legally prohibited or severely restricted? Can and will banks
and credit unions provide similar credit services at a lower cost? Will
informal-sector lenders, operating illegally, step up to provide banned
high-cost, short-term consumer loans? Would it be a good use of limited
law enforcement resources to try to prevent the emergence of such
informal-sector lenders? And, would the informal-sector lenders look
like the Hollywood version—tough thugs who threaten to break
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kneecaps—or would they operate elusively over the Internet with no
physical threats to customers who do not repay their loans?
Beyond the high quality of the Articles and the authors’ efforts to
address some or all of these three key themes, I was struck by another
characteristic of the work: the great diversity in the methodological
approaches to the issues. Not surprisingly, given the focus of the
symposium and the legal background of most of the authors, several of
the Articles contain nuanced analyses of existing legal and regulatory
structures; how new financial products, which did not exist a decade or
so ago, should fit into this environment; and how regulatory agencies
should function within legal constraints. Other Articles depart
dramatically from this approach. One, for example, draws lessons from
a television drama intended to offer a realistic portrayal of
communities of socially marginalized urban residents. Another is a
careful econometric study of the effects of access to payday loans on
populations within broad geographic areas. A third provides an
historical analysis of the prevalence over time of illegal, high-cost,
small-value lenders who employ physically coercive collection tactics.
Yet another Article draws on the author’s own small-scale survey of
title loan customers. And, as noted above, one of the Articles examines
the operations of micro-lenders outside the United States to assess
lessons they might provide for regulatory structures and fringe
financial operations relevant to this country.
Let me conclude by saying that I have followed the evolving fringe
economy for over twenty years and have attended many conferences
devoted to the topic, but this symposium stands out. As a group, the
authors are strikingly well-informed about how these markets actually
function, and the symposium includes eloquent and sincere exponents
for vastly divergent views of what types of regulatory structures are
likely to create the greatest social welfare. Readers will emerge with a
solid knowledge of the fringe economy and will find persuasive
arguments that challenge their initial perspectives.

